Abstract. The original stable marriage problem requires all men and women to submit a complete and strictly ordered preference list. This is obviously often unrealistic in practice, and several relaxations have been proposed, including the following two common ones: one is to allow an incomplete list, i.e., a man is permitted to accept only a subset of the women and vice versa. The other is to allow a preference list including ties. Fortunately, it is known that both relaxed problems can still be solved in polynomial time. In this paper, we show that the situation changes substantially if we allow both relaxations (incomplete lists and ties) at the same time: the problem not only becomes NP-hard, but also the optimal cost version has no approximation algorithm achieving the approximation ratio of N 1− , where N is the instance size, unless P=NP.
extension and showed that there is a polynomial-time algorithm which determines whether there exists a stable matching and finds one if one exists (see also [4] ). Thus the problem does not become essentially harder. (In this paper, the term "matching" when incomplete lists are allowed refers to a one-one correspondence between all the men and all the women, as is the definition for complete lists.)
In the second extension, each person is allowed to have a preference list with ties. m and w form a blocking pair if m and w are not partners in M , but m strictly prefers w to M (m) (i.e., w and M (m) are not tied in m's list) and w strictly prefers m to M (w). A matching containing no such blocking pair is called weakly stable. (Henceforth, usage of the term "a stable matching" when ties are allowed in the lists refers to weak stability.) However, this extension also does not make the problem significantly difficult; it is known that there always exists a stable matching (and a polynomial-time algorithm finds one) [4] . Now arises the natural question, i.e., whether or not the situation changes if we apply both extensions at the same time, which was open since [6] . Our main purpose of this paper is to show that the situation does change, i.e., the problem is now NP-complete if we allow both incomplete lists and ties. The problem is also intractable for complete lists if the question is not the existence of stable matchings but obtaining optimal cost stable matchings. We furthermore show that it is probably not possible to obtain good approximation algorithms for the optimal cost problem: unless P=NP, any approximation algorithm cannot achieve N 1− for any > 0 as its approximation ratio. The general perception for the stable marriage problem has been that it is basically not hard [1, 4, 6] . Our results could alter this common perception. (In the case of non-bipartite setting, i.e., for the so-called hospitals/residents problem and the stable roommates problem, some intractable results have been reported [8] , but none previously for the bipartite setting.)
Stable Marriage Problems
Recall that the original stable matching problem requires each person's preference list to be complete (i.e., all the members of the opposite sex must be included) and to be totally ordered. We focus on the three possible relaxations concerning these two restrictions. All these problems (including the original one) ask if there exists a stable matching. The first three problems are known to be in P [2, 4] . Our main result is the NP-completeness of the last one, shown in Sec.3. SMP-CLTO: the stable marriage problem with complete list and total order. SMP-ILTO: the stable marriage problem with incomplete list and total order. SMP-CLT: the stable marriage problem with complete list and ties. SMP-ILT: the stable marriage problem with incomplete list and ties.
If we consider the cost of a matching, we can introduce an optimization version of the stable marriage problem. Suppose that, under a stable matching M , a man m is matched with a woman w who is at the ith position in m's list. Then it is defined that the cost of the position of woman w in m's list is i and the cost of the matching M for man m is also i. The cost for a woman w is similarly defined. If there are ties in the list, then the cost of positions are determined as usual: for example, if m's list is w 3 , (w 2 , w 4 , w 5 ), w 1 , where w 2 , w 4 and w 5 are tied in the list, then the cost of the positions for w 3 , w 2 , w 4 , w 5 and w 1 are 1, 2, 2, 2 and 5, respectively. The cost of the matching M is the sum of the costs of M for all 2N people. (The stable matching that minimizes this cost is called the egalitarian stable matching [4] .) Here we consider the following two problems whose preference lists are always complete: MIN-SMP: Preference lists must be a total order. MIN-SMP-TIES: Preference lists may contain ties.
Both problems ask to find a stable matching whose cost is as small as possible. It is known that an optimal solution for MIN-SMP may be obtained in polynomial time [4] . We shall show the NP-hardness and inapproximability of MIN-SMP-TIES in Sec.4.
Intractability Results
Now we prove the NP-completeness of SMP-ILT. Note that this proof is further extended to show the inapproximability of MIN-SMP-TIES in the next section. Theorem 1. SMP-ILT is NP-complete. Proof. It is easy to see that SMP-ILT is in NP: given a matching M , one can check, for each man m and woman w, whether m and w form a blocking pair. This can be done in polynomial time. To show the NP-hardness, let us consider the problem ONE-IN-THREE 3SAT: given a 3CNF formula, it asks if there exists a truth assignment such that exactly one literal in each clause is true.
It is known that ONE-IN-THREE 3SAT remains NP-complete even if a 3CNF formula does not include negative literals [3] . So, we translate this restricted problem into SMP-ILT. Given f , which is an instance of ONE-IN-THREE 3SAT, we construct an instance T (f ) of SMP-ILT consisting of (1) a set of men and the same number of women, (2) each man's preference list, and (3) each woman's preference list. Let n and l be the numbers of variables and clauses of f = C 1 · C 2 · · · C l , respectively. Let t i be the number of appearances of the variable x i and let t = max{t 1 , t 2 , · · · , t n }.
The Set of Men and Women
T (f ) consists of 9l + 3n + t + 3 men and the same number of women. We first introduce the following set of men, who are divided into the following groups: 
Men's Preference Lists
We then construct each man's preference list (obviously in polynomial time). For better exposition, we use an example of f , i.e., f 0 = (
for which the men's preference lists will turn out to be as illustrated in Table 2 . Table 2 shows the whole lists of men of T (f 0 ).
Women's Preference Lists
Finally, we construct the women's preference lists. We construct the women's preference lists automatically from the men's preference lists. First, we determine the total order of all men; the position of each man in the order is called his rank. The rank of each man of our current example T (f 0 ) is shown in Table 2 It helps much to know that, by our construction of the women's preference lists, we can determine whether a matching includes a blocking pair or not from only the men's preference lists. Consider two men m i and m j who are matched with w i and w j , respectively. Then, (m i , w j ) is a blocking pair if and only if (i) m i strictly prefers w j to w i , (ii) m i 's rank is higher than m j 's rank, and (iii) the position of w j in m i 's list is higher than or equal to the position of w j in m j 's list. Observe that the combination of conditions (ii) and (iii) means that w j strictly prefers m i to m j . 
Useful Lemmas
Then we go back to Group-(B) men. Let C j = (x j1 + x j2 + x j3 ) be the jth clause in f . Then recall that there are three men m B,j,1 , m B,j,2 and m B,j,3 , and six women w Table 1 ). (3) Let, for 1 ≤ j ≤ l, the jth clause of f be C j = (x j1 + x j2 + x j3 ). Then the preference lists of the three men associated to C j are the ones described in Table 1 . Since M * is a solution, these men must be matched in the way described in Lemma Conversely, suppose that there exists a solution for f of ONE-IN-THREE 3SAT. Then, again using the association rule, we determine partners for the men in Groups (B) and (C). Partners for the men in Groups (A), (D) and (E) are automatically determined using Lemmas 1, 3 and 4. The fact that this matching is a solution for T (f ) can be easily seen from Lemmas 1 through 5. 2
Lemma 6. Suppose that a matching M for T (f ) is a solution. Then, for each i and j, the following statements (i), (ii) and (iii) are true: (i) If
M (m B,j,1 ) = w 1 d,i,j then M (m C,i ) = w 1 b,i . (ii) If M (m B,j,2 ) = w 0 d,i,j then M (m C,i ) = w 0 b,i . (iii) If M (m B,j,3 ) = w 0 d,i,j then M (m C,i ) = w 0 b,i .
Correctness of the Reduction

An Alternative Proof of Theorem 1
An alternative, shorter proof of the NP-completeness of SMP-ILT may be obtained by transforming from the problem EXACT MAXIMAL MATCHING, which takes a graph G and an integer K as input, and asks whether G has a maximal matching M with |M | = K. EXACT MAXIMAL MATCHING is NP-complete, even for bipartite graphs -this follows from the NP-completeness of the minimization version, MINIMUM MAXIMAL MATCHING, for the same class of graphs [9] .
Proof. Membership of SMP-ILT in NP was established in Theorem 1. To show the NP-hardness of SMP-ILT, we transform from EXACT MAXIMAL MATCHING for bipartite graphs; let G = (V, E) and K be an instance of this problem. Then G has a bipartition U, W . Without loss of generality we may assume that |U | = |W | = n, and that K ≤ n. Let U = {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n } and W = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n }. We construct an instance I of SMP-ILT as follows: let U ∪ X be the set of men, and let W ∪ Y be the set of women, where
Create preference lists for each person as follows:
In a preference list, persons within parentheses are tied. We claim that G has a maximal matching of size exactly K if and only if I has a stable matching. For, suppose that G has a maximal matching M where |M | = K. We construct a matching M in I as follows. For each edge {m i , w j } in M , we let w j be the partner of m i in M . The n − K remaining unmatched men in U are given a partner from Y , and likewise, the n − K remaining unmatched women in W are given a partner from X. Clearly M is a matching in I, and it is straightforward to verify that M is stable.
Conversely suppose that M is a stable matching in I. Then each of the n−K women in Y is matched with a man in U . Thus in M , exactly K men of the form m i is matched with a woman of the form w j ; let M contain the corresponding
The above transformation can be modified to show that SMP-ILT remains NP-complete even if the ties occur in the preference lists of one sex only, any tie occurs at the tail of some person's preference list, and a tie is of length 2 (details are omitted). This restriction arises naturally in practice: for example, in the applicants-hospitals matching problem, although applicants might be able to rank hospitals in strict order, a large hospital may wish to rank only a subset of its applicants in strict order, expressing indifference among the remainder.
Optimization Problems and Inapproximability
Once the NP-completeness of a problem is proved, our next step is to try to find approximation algorithms for its optimization version. A goodness measure of an approximation algorithm T of a minimization problem P is defined as usual: let x be an instance of the problem P of size N . Also, let opt(x) and T (x) be the costs of an optimal solution and a solution obtained by the algorithm T , respectively. T is said to be an r(N )-approximation algorithm if, for every x, T (x)/opt(x) ≤ r(N ). If there exists a polynomial-time bounded r(N )-approximation algorithm for P , then we say that P is approximable within r(N ).
There are several optimization problems that have only poor approximation algorithms. Among others, MAX-CLIQUE has received much attention recently because of its novel use of PCP. The latest result [5] says that this problem is not approximable within N 1− for any > 0 assuming NP =coRP, where N denotes the number of vertices in a given graph. MIN-UN-3SAT is also hard, which requires, given a 3CNF formula, to find a truth assignment that minimizes the number of unsatisfied clauses. So MIN-UN-3SAT is basically the same problem as MAX-3SAT; only the cost function differs. It is shown that MIN-UN-3SAT is not approximable within N 1− for any > 0, where N is the number of clauses in a given formula [7] . This result is obtained using a reduction from 3SAT, its NP-complete counterpart. The reduction makes many "copies" of an instance for 3SAT, which amplifies the gap of the cost between yes-instances and noinstances. We exploit this technique to show the inapproximability result for MIN-SMP-TIES. In doing so, a crucial point is how to "amplify" the gap, or how to "copy" the original instance so that the cost of solution will increase in a very different rate depending on the answer (yes/no) of the original instance. In the case of 3SAT, this is almost trivial since if the original formula is satisfiable then the number of unsatisfiable clauses is still zero for arbitrarily many copies. Our present case is not that easy.
Theorem 2. If P =NP, then MIN-SMP-TIES is not approximable within N 1− for any > 0. Proof. Let I be an instance of SMP-ILT obtained in the proof of Theorem 1. Let K = 9l + 3n + t + 3, which is the number of men and also the number of women in I. We translate I into an instance of MIN-SMP-TIES. Our target instance has 2K c men and the same number of women, where c is some constant. First of all, we introduce the set Recall that, the men in M i play the same role as the men in I and also the women in W i play the same role as the women in I. The list of a man m (in M i ) is just the same as the list of the man m in I who corresponds to m (but, of course, the women in the list are not the ones in I but the corresponding women in W i ). We call these women, i.e., the ones who now exist in m's list, proper for m. Note that m's list is not yet complete, so we have to make it complete. First, we add K c women in W U to the list arbitrarily but in total order right after the proper women, and then finally we add the remaining women to the list arbitrarily and in total order. The women's lists are similar; namely, a list of each woman w in W i is the same as the list of w in I. We also call these men in the list proper for w. Then we add K c men in M U and we add the remaining men arbitrarily as before. Now we have an instance, J, of MIN-SMP-TIES. As shown in [4] , there is always a stable matching for J if we do not care its cost.
Thus the list of m in M i includes proper women at the beginning, and then the long sequence of w 0,j in W U , and finally improper women. Hence, if m is not matched with a proper woman, he has to "jump" the long sequence of w 0,j 's and has to be matched with some improper woman. Formally, we can claim that the optimal cost for J is at most K c+1 when there is a stable matching for I and is greater than 2K 2c−1 otherwise. Hence if there were a polynomial-time approximation algorithm with approximation ratio as good as (2K 2c−1 )/K c+1 = 2K c−2 , then it could determine whether there is a stable matching for I in polynomial time (recall that c is a constant). Note that the size, N , of J is 2K 
